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Abstract
The “less is more” hypothesis suggests that one reason adults
and children differ in their language acquisition abilities is that
they also differ in other cognitive capacities: for instance, the
relatively poor memory and/or processing abilities of children
may make them more likely to over-regularize inconsistent in-
put (Singleton & Newport, 2004; Hudson Kam & Newport,
2005). We investigate this hypothesis by placing adults under
a high cognitive load using a standard task. Does their ten-
dency to over-regularize in a simultaneous language-learning
task increase? Results indicate that although the cognitive load
is high enough to impair overall learning, neither the pres-
ence of load nor poor working memory predicts greater over-
regularization. This suggests that if the “less is more” hypoth-
esis explains over-regularization in children, the relevant cog-
nitive capacity is not one that was impaired by our load task.
Keywords: language acquisition; over-regularization; statisti-
cal learning; memory; processing; development
Introduction
Children and adults differ both qualitatively and quantita-
tively in their ability to acquire a new language. Adults
have difficulty with many aspects of language acquisition,
from phonetic perception (Werker & Tees, 1984; Werker &
Lalonde, 1988; Kuhl, 2004), to language processing (Clahsen
& Felser, 2006), to certain aspects of syntax (e.g., Johnson &
Newport, 1989; Birdsong, 2006). Scientists have proposed
many theories to account for the difference between children
and adults; these theories differ in both the degree and type of
contribution made by pre-existing language-specific biases.
Although nearly everyone agrees that (due to the inherent log-
ical problem of induction posed by language learning) some
bias must be necessary to explain successful language acqui-
sition, explanations about the nature of the bias – and the dif-
ference between children and adults – vary considerably.
Some argue that there is a fundamental difference between
first- and second-language acquisition. They posit that acqui-
sition in children is guided by an innate Universal Grammar
and by language-specific acquisition procedures, whereas
adult acquisition is directed by more domain-general learning
mechanisms (e.g., Bley-Vroman, 1990). However, there are
many other possibilities, since children and adults also dif-
fer profoundly in their cognitive capabilities, knowledge, as-
sumptions, and typical linguistic input. For one thing, learn-
ing a second language is made more difficult by interference
from the first language; the evidence that experience with a
first language influences acquisition of a second language is
extensive (e.g., Mayberry, 1993; Iverson et al., 2003; Tan,
2003; Weber & Cutler, 2003; Hernandez, Li, & MacWhinney,
2005). This observation overlaps considerably with the re-
lated point that adult brains are less malleable than the brains
of children (Elman et al., 1996; MacWhinney, 2005). Adults
and children also differ in their style of learning (Ullman,
2004) and in the nature of the social support (Snow, 1999)
and linguistic input (Fernald & Simon, 1984) they receive.
The observation that children perform more poorly than
adults across most domains of cognitive ability, including
memory and processing speed, has led to another hypothe-
sis, often called “less is more.” It suggests that the relative
cognitive deficits in children may actually help with language
acquisition by enabling them to isolate and analyze the sepa-
rate components of a linguistic stimulus (Newport, 1988), or
by leading them to over-regularize inconsistent input (Hudson
Kam & Newport, 2005; Singleton & Newport, 2004). Indeed,
it is apparent that children over-regularize while adults often
do not. Deaf children exposed to the inconsistent sign lan-
guage of hearing parents will over-regularize that language
and produce regular grammatical forms (Singleton & New-
port, 2004), as will children exposed to inconsistent input
in an artificial language (Hudson Kam & Newport, 2005;
Goldowsky, 1995). By contrast, adult language learners are
known to produce highly variable, inconsistent utterances,
even after years of experience with the language and after
their grammars have stabilized (Wolfram, 1985; Johnson,
Shenkman, Newport, & Medin, 1996).
The difference between children and adults has also been
found in non-linguistic domains. If adults must predict some
phenomenon (e.g., a light flashing or a certain card being
drawn from a deck), they will tend to probability match: if the
phenomenon occurs 70% of the time, they will expect it 70%
of the time they are asked (see, e.g., Myers, 1976; Shanks,
Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002, for an overview). Children are
more likely to predict that the phenomenon will occur closer
to 100% of the time (e.g., Weir, 1964; Derks & Paclisanu,
1967). A similar pattern has been found in causal reasoning:
children over-regularize by assuming that causes are deter-
ministic, while adults do not (Schulz & Sommerville, 2006).
Although the tendency toward over-regularization is well-
established, the reason for the difference between adults and
children is far from clear. As previously mentioned, the “less
is more” hypothesis suggests that over-regularization may be
due to some aspect of children’s cognitive capacities, such as
their poorer memory or slower processing speed (Newport,
1988). Adults do tend to over-regularize more when the in-
put is complex, when the probabilities involved are small
(Gardner, 1957; Weir, 1964; Gluck & Bower, 1988; Hud-
son Kam & Newport, 2009), or when lexical retrieval is more
difficult (Hudson Kam & Chang, 2009). This may be because
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more complex input imposes more of a load on their cogni-
tive resources. The hypothesis is also supported by empirical
(Kersten & Earles, 2001) and computational (Elman, 1993)
work suggesting that learning is easier when early input is
simpler (although that work does not speak directly to the
issue of over-regularization). In general, there has been lit-
tle research that directly measures or manipulates memory or
processing speed and evaluates whether these are associated
with different degrees of over-regularization in adults.
Here we begin to investigate this question more directly.
Our goal is to evaluate whether we can effectively turn adults
into children by placing them under cognitive load. If defi-
ciencies in the particular capacities involved in the load tasks
are what cause children to over-regularize, then adults un-
der heavy load should behave more like children in their pat-
tern of over-regularization. We find that, although the cogni-
tive load is high enough to impair adult performance in other
ways – and although their working memory capacity predicts
overall performance on the task – neither increased cognitive
load nor poor working memory predicts or leads to increased
over-regularization. This suggests that, if the “less is more”
hypothesis is the explanation for childrens’ tendency to over-
regularize, the cognitive capacity that is “less” in children is
not one that is impaired by the load tasks we used.
Method
75 adults were recruited from the University of Adelaide and
surrounding community and were paid $10 for their partici-
pation. In the first part of the experiment, individual differ-
ences in working memory capacity were measured using a
standard complex span task (Conway, Jarrold, Kane, Miyake,
& Towse, 2007; Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & En-
gle, 2009). In the second part of the experiment, subjects
completed a word-learning task (modelled on the paradigm
described by Hudson Kam and Newport (2009)) in which
they were taught 10 two-word labels from a new language.
Interspersed with the word-learning task, participants in the
OPERATIONAL LOAD and VERBAL LOAD conditions com-
pleted an interference task (involving either solving equations
or reading sentences aloud, respectively). In a control con-
dition, the NO LOAD condition, participants performed the
word-learning task only. Specific details of the initial com-
plex span task and the subsequent word-learning task follow.
Complex span task
Complex span tasks are widely used to measure the capac-
ity of the working memory system (Conway et al., 2005;
Unsworth et al., 2009). In a complex span task, items to be
remembered (e.g., random letters, digits, shapes, or spatial
locations) are interspersed with an unrelated cognitive activ-
ity (e.g., solving equations, reading sentences, or evaluating
the symmetry of patterns). After several trials, participants
are asked to recall the items to be remembered in the cor-
rect serial order. This sort of task is differentiated from a
simple span task (e.g., Digit Span from the Wechsler scales),
which only includes the memorization component; it has been
argued that complex span tasks provide a measure of work-
ing memory (as opposed to span memory) because they en-
tail the requirement to process as well as to store informa-
tion. Complex span tasks have been shown to correlate with
cognitive processes that are believed to depend on working
memory (Conway et al., 2007; Unsworth & Engle, 2007), and
are linked to disorders including Alzheimer’s disease (Rosen,
Bergeson, Putnam, Harwel, & Sunderland, 2002). They have
also been widely used to explore age differences in working
memory capacity (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982; Salt-
house & Babcock, 1991).
Two common span tasks incorporate demands on either
operational span (Turner & Engle, 1989) or on verbal span
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), respectively. In an operational
span task, participants are presented with equations such as
4/2 + 2 = 3 and told to say, as quickly as possible, whether
the equation is correct. In a typical verbal span task, sub-
jects are presented with an 11-15 word sentence and told to
say, as quickly as possible, whether the sentence makes sense.
In order to enable comparison across participants, in the first
part of the experiment all participants were presented with
an operational span task regardless of condition. On each
trial people first saw an equation and were asked whether it
was correct or not. After each response, a random letter was
shown. At the end of a set of n letters, participants were asked
to repeat the list of letters in order, given unlimited time to do
so. To make sure that they understood the task, they were first
trained on two sets of two trials each. The full task comprised
two sets each of sizes ranging from an n of three to an n of
seven, for a total of 50 trials. For each participant a working
memory capacity score was calculated, reflecting the number
of correct letters recalled in the correct position.
Word-learning task
After the complex span task, all participants took part in an
artificial language learning task modelled after a similar task
described by Hudson Kam and Newport (2009). Their lan-
guage contained 51 words, including 36 nouns and 12 verbs,
among other lexical items, taught over the course of eight sep-
arate sessions extending for 9-12 days. Of critical interest in
their study was the evaluation of performance on the deter-
miners, which were associated with nouns in an inconsistent
fashion: participants heard the main determiner only 60% of
the time. In one condition, they heard nothing the other 40%
of the time; in four other conditions, they heard increasingly
more noise determiners (e.g., two determiners (each 20% of
the time), and so forth up to 16 determiners (each 2.5% of
the time)). Performance was measured in a sentence comple-
tion task in which participants had to provide the noun and
determiner associated with a scene and sentence.
We sought to remove extraneous elements of the task so
as to focus on the determiner-production aspect while still re-
taining the important details. We therefore presented partic-
ipants with a “language” of 10 nouns, all two-syllable non-
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sense words1 mapped to images representing common ob-
jects.2 Each noun was followed by a one-syllable deter-
miner:3 the main determiner occurred 60% of the time, and
each of the four noise determiners occurred 10% of the time.
The specific mapping of the word to the meaning and which
determiner was the main determiner were randomized for
each participant.
Over the course of the task, participants saw 200 trials of
image-label pairs. On each trial, an image appeared on the
computer screen and, at the same time, the person heard a fe-
male voice provide the label: for instance, they might see a
picture of a baby and hear churbit mog. In the NO LOAD con-
dition, participants went to the next trial by clicking a next
button; in the two load conditions, the image remained visi-
ble for 1.5 seconds and then the next phase of the trial began
automatically (as explained below). In all conditions, learn-
ing was tested with 10 questions every 50 trials, for a total of
40 test questions. At each test, the participant was presented
with an image and asked to verbally produce the label for it,
which the experimenter wrote down. No feedback was given.
Subjects in the two load conditions completed the same
word learning task, except that after each image-label pair,
they were asked to perform an unrelated task designed to in-
crease their cognitive load. In the OPERATIONAL LOAD con-
dition, the task was modelled after the operational span test
(Turner & Engle, 1989): participants were presented with an
equation and told to respond as quickly as possible whether
it was correct or not. Half of the equations were correct, and
half gave an answer that was one digit away from correct. In
order to encourage them to be as fast and correct as possi-
ble, a running total of their number correct and elapsed time
was displayed on the screen. In the VERBAL LOAD condition,
the task was modelled after the verbal span test (Daneman &
Carpenter, 1980): participants were presented with an 11-15
word sentence, told to read it aloud, and then asked to respond
as quickly as possible whether it was sensible or not. Half of
the sentences were sensible, and half were made non-sensible
by replacing a content word with a semantically inappropriate
one.4 As before, accuracy and elapsed time was displayed in
order to encourage peak performance.
Results
There are three natural questions we must answer in order to
properly understand this experiment. First, is the load task
difficult enough? Second, did participants in either of the
load conditions over-regularize by producing the main de-
terminer more than 60% of the time? Third, did individ-
ual differences in performance on the initial complex span
1Noun words used were: dragnip, raygler, churbit, tramdel, shel-
bin, pugbo, wolid, foutray, nipag, and yeetom.
2Objects used were: babies, balls, beds, birds, books, cars, cats,
cups, dogs, and shoes.
3The five determiners were: mot, ped, sib, kag, and zuf.
4For example, a typical sentence is “Cats really love to sit in the
sun, since they are desert animals” while the corresponding non-


































Figure 1: Performance by condition in the noun-learning task.
Participants in the two load conditions learned significantly fewer
nouns, indicating that the load task provided sufficient cognitive
challenge to impair performance.
task predict performance on the word-learning task? The an-
swer to the first question is an essential pre-requisite to in-
terpreting the answers to the other two because if the load
task was not challenging enough, comparisons between con-
ditions are meaningless. The answers to the other two bear
directly on the questions motivating this work: does putting
adults under cognitive load cause them to make the same
over-regularization errors that children do? Are adults with
poorer performance on the complex span task (and hence
lower working memory capacity) more likely to make those
errors? We address each of these questions in turn.
Was the load task difficult enough?
There are several ways to evaluate whether the load tasks
were sufficiently challenging to the cognitive capacities of
our participants, whilst still being easy enough so that peo-
ple could acquire at least some of the image-label mappings
in the word-learning task. One indication is that participants
in both conditions scored far above chance on the load items,
suggesting that they took that task seriously.
To evaluate the degree of difficulty the tasks imposed, we
can compare how well participants in each of the three con-
ditions learned the correct noun-image mappings. One would
expect that performance would be substantially worse in the
two load conditions if the secondary task provided a sufficient
challenge to the cognitive capacities of our participants. To
explore this, we coded each person’s answers as correct if the
noun they produced was identical to or phonologically sim-
ilar (e.g., wolin instead of wolid) to the correct noun for that
image. Figure 1 demonstrates that participants in both load
conditions got fewer nouns correct than in the NO LOAD con-
dition, indicating that the interference tasks were, indeed, im-
posing significant strain on their cognitive resources. There
was no difference in the number of nouns correct between the
OPERATIONAL LOAD and VERBAL LOAD conditions.5
5A one-way Anova on nouns correct by condition was signifi-
cant: F(2,72) = 4.63, p = 0.0129. Post-hoc comparisons using the
Tukey-Kremar test indicated that the mean score for the NO LOAD

































Figure 2: Performance by condition in determiner production. There
was no significant difference between conditions in tendency to
over-regularize, and in no condition did people produce the main
determiner beyond the 60% it appeared in the input.
Did adults over-regularize more when under
cognitive load?
The central question motivating this research was whether
adults placed under cognitive load could be made to look
more like children. To evaluate this, following Hudson Kam
and Newport (2009), we excluded all participants who did
not get at least 9 out of the final 20 nouns correct on the test
trials.6 Then, on every valid trial (i.e., every trial for which
a correct noun was produced), we calculated the percentage
of time either the main determiner, a noise determiner, or no
determiner was produced. Figure 2 demonstrates that there
were no significant differences between conditions in terms
of main determiner production: that is, participants in the
load conditions did not over-regularize.7 If anything, partici-
pants in the OPERATIONAL LOAD condition tended to under-
regularize, which is the opposite of what one would expect if
limited available memory or processing power was the driv-
ing force behind over-regularization.
This is suggestive, but because it is an analysis of mean
performances this outcome may be hiding individual over-
regularization in different directions. To evaluate this pos-
sibility, we followed Hudson Kam and Newport (2009) and
set a “consistency threshold” of 90%: each participant was
coded as consistent main, consistent noise, or consistent none
if they produced the determiner type in question on at least
90% of the valid trials, and not consistent if they did not.8
Figure 3 shows that few participants were consistent in any
mean for the OPERATIONAL LOAD (M = 0.479,SD = 0.05) and
VERBAL LOAD (M = 0.482,S = 0.05) conditions, but the latter two
were not significantly different from each other.
6This resulted in 23 subjects in the NO LOAD condition and 17
in each of the others. We ran each of these analyses without this
exclusion and results were qualitatively identical in all cases.
7One-way Anova on main determiner production by condition:
F(2,54) = 2.64, p = 0.0806. To further explore this outcome, a
post-hoc comparison using Tukey-Kramer indicated no significant
difference between any of the conditions compared pairwise.
8Results are qualitatively identical even with thresholds of 70%
or 80%: there are more consistent participants in those cases, but
still no difference between conditions.






























Figure 3: Individual consistency in determiner production by con-
dition. For the most part, few participants showed any consistency
in their pattern of determiner usage, and those in the load conditions
did not tend to be more consistent.
way, and differences between conditions were minor. In or-
der to determine if the tendency to over-regularize changed as
they acquired more of the language, we repeated the analyses
shown in both Figure 2 and 3 at each of the four stages of
testing. There were no differences in behavior at any stage.
Does working memory span have any effect on
performance?
The results presented thus far suggest that people with less
available working memory capacity (i.e., those in the two
load conditions) did not over-regularize the main determiner
more than did those in the control condition. Our exper-
iment also provides another way to evaluate how working
memory capacity affects over-regularization: by analyzing
whether individual differences in performance on the initial
complex span task predicts differential performance on the
word-learning task. As one would expect, performance on
the complex span task is positively and significantly corre-
lated with the ability to learn the noun-image mappings (ρ =
0.3811, p = 0.0013): participants with greater working mem-
ory capacity learned more noun labels. However, there is no
relation between working memory capacity and the tendency
to produce the main determiner (ρ = 0.1066, p = 0.387), nor
do the scatterplots indicate a non-linear relationship.
Discussion
On first glance, our findings might appear to contradict those
of Hudson Kam and Chang (2009), who found that over-
regularization in adults could be diminished by improving the
ease of lexical retrieval. There are three notable differences
here. First, they aimed to make adults less like children by
making the cognitive load easier, rather than to make adults
act more like children by making it harder. It is possible that
there is an inherent asymmetry to adults’ performance: that it
is relatively easy to make adults over-regularize less, but that
getting them to regularize more is difficult. This is certainly
the case in the decision-making literature, in which great ef-
forts have been made to stop adults from probability match-
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ing (e.g., Shanks et al., 2002). Second, and more importantly,
the study by Hudson Kam and Chang (2009) examined a dif-
ferent aspect of cognitive load (lexical retrieval rather than
working memory capacity). It is possible that differences in
lexical retrieval abilities are related to differences in over-
regularization between children and adults, but that differ-
ences impaired by our load task were not. Third, our language
was far simpler than theirs; it is possible that our participants
treated the task like paired-associate learning rather than like
learning a language with rich internal structure, unlike adult
learners in other studies that tasked load (Pitts Cochran, Mc-
Donald, & Parault, 1999). We think this would be a rather
surprising explanation of our findings, given that the task it-
self (learning determiner-noun pairings) was the same in both
studies, and the main difference was the complexity of the
rest of the system they were embedded in; however, it is an
open question that we seek to resolve with future work.
The central issue, of course, is what abilities were impaired
by our load task? In many ways, the two load tasks were
quite different: one involved solving equations, while the
other involved reading sentences aloud and answering ques-
tions about them. Despite this, it has been shown that the
complex working memory tests related to these tasks tend to
load highly on the same broad working memory factor (e.g.,
Oberauer, Su¨ß, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2003). It may there-
fore not be a surprise that both load tasks had similar effects.
The interesting aspect of this is that these tasks were specif-
ically designed to create a load on multiple different cog-
nitive capacities at once: unlike simple span tasks (such as
Digit Span on the Wechsler), which capture only the storage
component of memory, these require processing as well. In
general, these load tasks should be disrupting many aspects
of cognition: among other things, they require people to re-
trieve information from long-term memory (word meanings
in the VERBAL LOAD condition, number and symbol mean-
ings in the OPERATIONAL LOAD condition), to store informa-
tion in short-term memory (the words in the current sentence
or numbers in the current equation), to manipulate represen-
tations (to determine the correct answer to the questions), to
regulate attention, and to perform the load task while simul-
taneously learning word-referent mappings. It is interesting
that, despite their generality, the load tasks still did not lead
to over-regularization in word learning.
How might we interpret these results? One possibility is
that the “less is more” hypothesis is incorrect: that children’s
tendency to over-regularize does not stem from differences
in cognitive capacity. Such a possibility is consistent with
previous studies finding no effect of load on adult learners
(Ludden & Gupta, 2000) as well as other empirical findings in
language acquisition showing that children with better mem-
ories or faster processing speed actually do better at learning
language (e.g., Fernald, Perfors, & Marchman, 2006; Rose,
Feldman, & Jankowski, 2009).
That said, we cannot be certain that “less is more” is in-
correct. It is in theory possible that our load tasks did not
sufficiently challenge our subjects enough, and that more dif-
ficult ones would result in more over-regularization. This is
unlikely, not only because the participants anecdotally seem
to have found the task extremely difficult (one person called
it the hardest psychology experiment he had ever done), but
also because the load tasks had such strong effects on the abil-
ity to learn the nouns in the first place. The task would some-
how have to be difficult enough to cause over-regularization
but not so difficult as to render the task impossible: a bal-
ancing act that, if nothing else, seems unlikely to precisely
describe the state of child language learners.
This point, however, raises the converse possibility: per-
haps our language-learning task was so difficult (such that
even in the no-load condition, participants were only about
70% correct overall9) that with longer training, the pattern
we observed might change. While always a possibility, we
think this is more unlikely than other explanations, since we
observed no detectable change in tendency to over-regularize
over the course of the experiment.
Another possibility is that, because our load task items
were interspersed rather than concurrent with the words to
be learned, it was less of a burden on concurrent memory and
processing speed, and more of a burden on executive control.
If so, this would suggest that the differential abilities between
children and adults is not due to cognitive control, as has been
suggested in a different context (Thompson-Schill, Ramscar,
& Chrysikou, 2009). We plan to explore this issue in future
work using a concurrent load task like verbal shadowing.
Even if our load task does impair memory and processing
speed, there remain some likely possibilities for how the “less
is more” hypothesis might be correct and still be consistent
with our results. In addition to memory and processing speed,
children and adults also differ in the ability to use metacog-
nitive strategies (e.g., Flavell, Green, Flavell, Harris, & Ast-
ington, 1995). It may be that adults’ ability to introspect and
reason about their own cognition makes them more likely to
rely on explicit rather than implicit learning (Ullman, 2004) –
a difference that has been hypothesized to be the root of child-
adult differences in language acquisition. Such metacognitive
ability might also make adults more likely to try to capture or
imagine patterns in the input that do not exist; this tendency
has been suggested as an explanation for why adults prob-
ability match in non-language tasks (Estes, 1976). It might
result from a generalized preference for simplicity (or ten-
dency to ignore exceptions) on the part of children. It is also
possible that having limited memory or processing abilities
is especially important for language learning as a child but
not as an adult, analogously to a similar hypothesis found in
other developmental domains (Turkewitz & Kenny, 1982). A
great deal of work remains to be done to investigate the many
possibilities that remain open.
9Keeping in mind that, since there were 10 objects and it was a
free-response task, this is actually far above chance performance.
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